Accuracy and the Laws of Credence
«Pettigrew's brilliant book contributes greatly to the systematic development and understanding of Bayesian epistemology and should be read by any serious student of the subject.»
Erik J. Olsson, Metascience
Richard Pettigrew offers an extended investigation into a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern our credences (or degrees of belief). The main principles that he justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, though many other related principles are discussed along the way. Les mer
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the objective chances should relate to credences in other propositions; the Principle of Indifference, which says that, in the absence of evidence, we should distribute our credences equally over all possibilities we entertain; and Conditionalization, the Bayesian account of how we should plan to
respond when we receive new evidence. Ultimately, then, this book is a study in the foundations of Bayesianism.
To justify these principles, Pettigrew looks to decision theory. He treats an agent's credences as if they were a choice she makes between different options, gives an account of the purely epistemic utility enjoyed by different sets of credences, and then appeals to the principles of decision theory to show that, when epistemic utility is measured in this way, the credences that violate the principles listed above are ruled out as irrational. The account of epistemic utility set out here is the
veritist's: the sole fundamental source of epistemic utility for credences is their accuracy. Thus, Pettigrew conducts an investigation in the version of Iepistemic utility theory known as accuracy-first epistemology. The book can also be read as an extended reply on behalf of the veritist to the
evidentialist's objection that veritism cannot account for certain evidential principles of credal rationality, such as the Principal Principle, the Principle of Indifference, and Conditionalization.
Detaljer
- Forlag
- Oxford University Press
- Innbinding
- Paperback
- Språk
- Engelsk
- ISBN
- 9780198822462
- Utgivelsesår
- 2018
- Format
- 24 x 16 cm
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«Pettigrew's brilliant book contributes greatly to the systematic development and understanding of Bayesian epistemology and should be read by any serious student of the subject.»
Erik J. Olsson, Metascience
«For someone who is interested in the relations among these principles, and how they might relate to veritism, this book is essential reading. It does not aim to convince, but instead aims to develop an overall view of a part of epistemology, and show how it fits together. It highlights the weak points, for the purposes of spurring the development of new arguments to shore them up. And it ends with a brief listing of topics for future work. For the general topic of how evidential principles can be derived from a pure concern with truth, Pettigrew's book represents the state of the art.»
Kenny Easwaran, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews