Virtue Theoretic Epistemology

Virtue Theoretic Epistemology

Virtue epistemology is one of the most flourishing research programmes in contemporary epistemology. Its defining thesis is that properties of agents and groups are the primary focus of epistemic theorising. Within virtue epistemology two key strands can be distinguished: virtue reliabilism, which focuses on agent properties that are strongly truth-conducive, such as perceptual and inferential abilities of agents; and virtue responsibilism, which focuses on intellectual virtues in the sense of character traits of agents, such as open-mindedness and intellectual courage. This volume brings together ten new essays on virtue epistemology, with contributions to both of its key strands, written by leading authors in the field. It will advance the state of the art and provide readers with a valuable overview of what virtue epistemology has achieved.

Introduction. Virtue theoretic epistemology Christoph Kelp; 1. Closed-mindedness as an intellectual vice Heather Battaly; 2. Epistemic virtues and virtues with epistemic content Cameron Boult, Christoph Kelp, Johanna Schnurr and Mona Simion; 3. Difficulty and knowledge Fernando Broncano-Berrocal; 4. What is epistemic entitlement? Reliable competence, reasons, inference, access Peter Graham; 5. Knowledge-producing abilities John Greco; 6. Virtue epistemology, two kinds of internalism, and the intelligibility problem Jonathan Kvanvig; 7. Knowledge is extrinsically apt belief: virtue epistemology and the temporal objection Anne Meylan; 8. Explaining knowledge Alan Millar; 9. Anti-risk virtue epistemology Duncan Pritchard; 10. Responsibilism within reason Kurt Sylvan.

This volume brings together new essays on virtue epistemology, one of the leading approaches in the theory of knowledge.