Introduction Igor Douven; 1. Rational belief and statistical evidence: blame, bias, and the law Dana Nelkin; 2. Knowledge
attributions and lottery cases: a review and new evidence John Turri; 3. The psychological dimension of the lottery paradox
Jennifer Nagel; 4. Three puzzles about lotteries Julia Staffel; 5. Four arguments for denying that lottery beliefs are justified
Martin Smith; 6. Rethinking the lottery paradox: a dual processing perspective Igor Douven and Shira Elqayam; 7. Rational
belief in lottery- and preface-situations: impossibility results and possible solutions Gerhard Schurz; 8. Stability and the
lottery paradox Hannes Leitgeb; 9. The lottery, the preface and epistemic rule consequentialism Christoph Kelp and Francesco
Praolini; 10. Beliefs, probabilities, and their coherent correspondence Kevin Kelly and Hanti Lin; 11. The relation between
degrees of belief and binary beliefs: a general impossibility theorem Franz Dietrich and Christian List; Bibliography; Index.