«The account offered is unique among recent treatments of the paradoxes for saving a perfectly transparent truth predicate, whereby x and x is true are fully intersubstitutable. This feature, and its stabilisation within a bivalent framework, give the book considerable specialist interest. but the informality of the treatment, achieved without significant compromise of rigour, provides in addition for a remarkably effective and readable introduction to the contemporary debate about the paradoxes.»

Crispin Wright, New York University

«...although paradoxes such as the Liar have provided the main motivation for dialetheism, it is remarkable that previous dialetheic theories do not preserve the minimalist view of truth. Spandrels of Truth is the first dialetheic attempt to do so, and it addresses the main problems (e.g. the conditional) that a dialetheic minimalist must face. It is a very welcome addition to the literature.»

Hartry Field, New York University

«In this excellent book, Beall defends this combination of dialethism and transparency, drawing out its consequences with clarity and verve. The book also serves as an introduction to transparent theories of truth more generally, by including a valuable discussion of the leading rival: Field's transparent but non-dialethic account. It adds up to an attractive package: if I were a dialethist, I'd be Beall's kind of dialethist!»

Robert Williams, University of Leeds

«JC Beall concisely presents and defends a simple, modest, dialetheic approach to truth and semantic paradoxes... it does a great job in presenting and defending its ideas... an excellent and readable introduction to the contemporary technical discussions about truth and semantic paradoxes.»

Wen-fang Wang, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews