Politics of Bad Options
Why the Eurozone's Problems Have Been So Hard to Resolve
«In a new book by Stefanie Walter, Ari Ray, and Nils Redeker, The Politics of Bad Options: Why the Eurozone's Problems Have Been So Hard to Resolve (Oxford University Press 2020), the authors argue that the costs of resolution in the Eurozone crisis were borne almost exclusively by indebted deficit countries, whereas the creditor-surplus states did little to share the burden. While debtor states were forced to implement austerity measures and structural reforms that were almost unprecedented in scale, surplus countries—their argument goes—did not significantly adjust their economic policies.»
Nils Karlson, Professor of Political Science and President of the Ratio Institute, Stockholm, Sweden
Why was the Eurozone crisis so difficult to resolve? Why was it resolved in a manner in which some countries bore a much larger share of the pain than other countries? Why did no country leave the Eurozone rather than implement unprecedented austerity? Who supported and opposed the different policy options in the crisis domestically, and how did the distributive struggles among these groups shape crisis politics?
Building on macro-level statistical data, original survey data from interest groups, and qualitative comparative case studies, this book argues and shows that the answers to these questions revolve around distributive struggles about how the costs of the Eurozone crisis should be divided among countries, and within countries, among different socioeconomic groups.
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Why was the Eurozone crisis so difficult to resolve? Why was it resolved in a manner in which some countries bore a much larger share of the pain than other countries? Why did no country leave the Eurozone rather than implement unprecedented austerity? Who supported and opposed the different policy options in the crisis domestically, and how did the distributive struggles among these groups shape crisis politics?
Building on macro-level statistical data, original survey data from interest groups, and qualitative comparative case studies, this book argues and shows that the answers to these questions revolve around distributive struggles about how the costs of the Eurozone crisis should be divided among countries, and within countries, among different socioeconomic groups. Together with divergent but strongly held ideas about the 'right way' to conduct economic policy and asymmetries in the distribution
of power among actors, severe distributive concerns of important actors lie at the root of the difficulties of resolving the Eurozone crisis as well as the difficulties to substantially reform EMU. The book provides new insights into the politics of the Eurozone crisis by emphasizing three
perspectives that have received scant attention in existing research: a comparative perspective on the Eurozone crisis by systematically comparing it to previous financial crises, an analysis of the whole range of policy options, including the ones not chosen, and a unified framework that examines crisis politics not just in deficit-debtor, but also in surplus-creditor countries.
Building on macro-level statistical data, original survey data from interest groups, and qualitative comparative case studies, this book argues and shows that the answers to these questions revolve around distributive struggles about how the costs of the Eurozone crisis should be divided among countries, and within countries, among different socioeconomic groups. Together with divergent but strongly held ideas about the 'right way' to conduct economic policy and asymmetries in the distribution
of power among actors, severe distributive concerns of important actors lie at the root of the difficulties of resolving the Eurozone crisis as well as the difficulties to substantially reform EMU. The book provides new insights into the politics of the Eurozone crisis by emphasizing three
perspectives that have received scant attention in existing research: a comparative perspective on the Eurozone crisis by systematically comparing it to previous financial crises, an analysis of the whole range of policy options, including the ones not chosen, and a unified framework that examines crisis politics not just in deficit-debtor, but also in surplus-creditor countries.
Detaljer
- Forlag
- Oxford University Press
- Innbinding
- Innbundet
- Språk
- Engelsk
- ISBN
- 9780198857013
- Utgivelsesår
- 2020
- Format
- 24 x 16 cm
- Priser
- Winner of Honorable mention, EPS best book prize, APSA European Politics and Society Section.
Anmeldelser
«In a new book by Stefanie Walter, Ari Ray, and Nils Redeker, The Politics of Bad Options: Why the Eurozone's Problems Have Been So Hard to Resolve (Oxford University Press 2020), the authors argue that the costs of resolution in the Eurozone crisis were borne almost exclusively by indebted deficit countries, whereas the creditor-surplus states did little to share the burden. While debtor states were forced to implement austerity measures and structural reforms that were almost unprecedented in scale, surplus countries—their argument goes—did not significantly adjust their economic policies.»
Nils Karlson, Professor of Political Science and President of the Ratio Institute, Stockholm, Sweden
«The Euro crisis was a defining moment in European integration that continues to shape the trajectory of the EU. In this theoretically innovative and empirically rigorous book, Walter, Ray, and Redeker present new insights into the political dynamics and constraints shaping the policy responses to the Euro crisis. Importantly, they study all the available options and trade-offs to explain why specific policies were chosen. The book is an invaluable contribution to understanding the politics of the Euro crisis.»
Sara Hobolt, LSE
«The Eurozone crisis has been the greatest failure in the history of European integration. The European Union's member states were patently unable to negotiate their way to an economically, politically, and socially sensible resolution of the crisis. The Politics of Bad Options explains the course and results of the Eurozone crisis with theoretical and empirical clarity. Walter, Ray, and Redeker analyze the sources of the conflicts between creditor/surplus and debtor/deficit countries. They explain the domestic political economies of debtor and creditor nations, and the disastrous course of their attempts to resolve the crisis. The Politics of Bad Options is required reading for anyone interested in the European Union, international debt, and more broadly and comparative and international political economy.»
Jeffry Frieden, Harvard University
«I found this is an exciting and very thought provoking book, making me think both more and differently about the Eurozone's crises. First, thinking seriously about the surplus countries (after being so focussed on the pathologies of Southern Europe) is a great and illuminating discipline. Second, and based on distributional conflicts, it provides a carefully thought out and original analytic framework. And third it is seriously - hence really usefully - comprehensive and reliable. Based on Walter's major research programme, it represents the high level of intellectual results which can come from intense and coordinated collaboration.»
David Soskice, LSE