This book looks at the history of the US Air Force through the lens of its (lack of) preparedness for major wars, which is shown to be a result of its organizational culture.

The U.S. Air Force is probably the most powerful military force in history, both in its destructive firepower and in its ability to project it globally. Yet, despite its unparalleled power, the Air Force entered its first three pivotal conflicts – World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War – unprepared. But surprisingly, it was remarkably well prepared for its fourth major war: the Gulf War of 1991. Could there be an underlying trait or characteristic, which influenced the Air Force between the wars, that historically caused the US Air Force to be unprepared for war or prepared for the wrong type of war? Surprisingly, there is such a factor which was quite prominent in the Air Force’s complex identity – its organizational culture. Besides providing a historical description of the Air Force, this book demonstrates clearly how its organizational culture evolved and how it caused the US Air Force to be prepared for the wrong war. It also shows that when the organizational culture changed, the Air Force changed its focus and arrived prepared for the following war: the 1991 Gulf War.

This book will be of interest to students of air power, strategic studies, US public policy, and security studies in general.