In rebuilding conflict-affected states, a major portion of foreign aid focuses on reforming public finance management systems and supporting annual budgets. But how budgets are allocated and how reforms take shape in practice remain critical questions.

This book analyses the politics of reform and budget allocation in the most expensive liberal state building effort in history: Afghanistan. Through a detailed political economy analysis, it explores the origin, continuity, and evolution of Afghanistan’s centralized public finance management system. Such centralization, readopted in the 2004 Constitution, constrained local participation, perpetuated inequities, and undermined predictability and transparency. Key reforms including the “Provincial Development Planning Guideline” and “Provincial Budgeting Policy” aimed to address these shortcomings but failed due to political resistance, elite capture, and structural inefficiencies. The analysis reveals informal dynamics behind the allocation of discretionary development budget consisting of the Afghan central government’s political considerations (political relationship, political importance, and strength and weakness of local administrations) and lobbying strategies of local actors. This dynamic enabled the central government to continue to use public funds for purchasing political legitimacy to remain in power.

Afghanistan’s case highlights the limits of externally driven state-building that prioritizes centralization over local dynamics. The book offers key lessons on inclusive governance, structural barriers, and sustainable public finance reforms in conflict-affected states. It appeals to donors, development experts, and researchers in public finance, foreign aid, security, and development studies.